Introduction
Telecommunications is one of the most technology-intensive and internationalized sectors of Europe's economy, presenting users with an unprecedented array of sophisticated, interactive, content-rich services with global-reach potential -a situation very different from the 1980s when European telecommunications was a highly statecentric, nationally balkanized sector. Explaining this remarkable transformation has stimulated considerable academic work, not least by political scientists. A number of studies have analyzed national regulatory changes in either single country (Garnham 1985; Humphreys 1990 Humphreys , 1992 or cross-national comparative studies (Morgan and Webber 1986; Grande 1989; Hulsink 1999; Thatcher 1999; Bartle 2002a; Bartle et al. 2002; Coen et al. 2002) . Equally important has been the emergence of telecommunications governance at the European level within the institutional context of the EU. Political scientists have debated the influence that institutional actors, notably the European Commission, have exerted on policy developments, some stressing the primacy of supranational institutional forces (Sandholtz, 1993 (Sandholtz, , 1998 Schneider et al. 1994 , LeviFaur 1999 , others downplaying their influence vis a vis Member States (Thatcher 2001b; . 1 This article contributes to such work through employing the complementary conceptual lenses of the 'competition' state and the 'regulatory' state in an era of economic globalization (Humphreys and Simpson 2005) . It pursues three lines of enquiry. First, the paper explores how, in response to globalization pressures, EU Member States simultaneously relinquished ownership of and created competition within their telecommunications sectors, behaviour explained by theoretical work on the 'competition' state. Second, it explores how, having assumed the role of 'competition' states, governments became involved necessarily in re-building the governance of telecommunications through re-regulation, to the extent that they have become 'regulatory' states. In its exploration of the complementarities of, but also the tensions between, the 'competition' and the 'regulatory' state, the article analyses how reform involved agreement to a process of 'Europeanization' of its governance at the EU level, the third line of enquiry. Here, the paper pays particular attention to the EU's adoption of a new 'Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework' (ECRF).
The Context
Traditionally, telecommunications governance across Europe had been premised on the 'state-centricity' of the sector. The state was monopoly owner/operator of networks and services. This avoided duplication, assured technical compatibility, maintained network integrity, exploited economies of scale, and guaranteed universal service. State monopoly structures served protectionist industrial policy goals. International cooperation was confined largely to technical matters and international tariffs and accounting rules, agreed in classic intergovernmental fashion through the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) . From the 1980s, this 'ancient regime' was undermined by new technologies and globalization (Humphreys and Simpson 2005: p. 21-8) .
Transmission was revolutionized by high-bandwidth cable, satellite, microwave, mobile telephony, and (lately) Internet telephony; telephonic switching, by the transition from mechanical to digital switching and 'packet switching'; terminal equipment, by the microprocessor ('computerization'). The new technologies facilitated alternative networks and diverse new 'value-added' (network) services (VAS or VANS).
Telecommunications (apart from the 'local loop' or 'last mile') came to be considered potentially competitive, rather than a natural monopoly. Moreover, the new technologies called for levels of investment requiring global market strategies. Their 'distance shrinking' character highlighted how telecommunications both exemplified a globalising economic sector and was an enabler of global economic activity, fuelling globalization (especially in the financial sector), stimulating demands from trans-national telecommunications users for liberalization. Further, national telecommunication systems could now be bypassed, for instance by international 'call back' services. Crucially, a modern telecommunications sector became a factor for economic investment and location decisions. Thus, the 'first mover' telecommunications liberalizers -the USA and the UK -unleashed a global dynamic of international 'regulatory competition' and 'competitive emulation' Simpson, 1996 and .
Under the pressure of globalization, technological change, the diffusion of neo-liberal ideas, and the competitive challenge from the USA and UK, the Continental Europeans became persuaded that liberalization was unavoidable if they were to retain the international competitiveness both of their domestic telecommunications sectors and of their economies at large. They now perceived European market balkanization and lack of competitiveness as impediments to the realization of more diverse, sophisticated and affordable services. With the growing recognition that telecommunications was the nerve centre of a global 'information society', a new EU-wide consensus developed in the early 1990s in favour of full liberalization and a harmonized pro-competitive regulatory regime. Between 1987, when the Commission published its reform blueprint in a Green
Paper, and 1998, when markets were fully opened, a series of EU liberalization and regulatory harmonization directives were enacted, the former directly by the Commission, while the latter were negotiated inter-governmentally, transposed and implemented by the Member States. The 'Europeanization' of telecoms regulation meant that Member State regulatory policy was increasingly determined through the complex interaction of supranational institutions, notably the Commission, and intergovernmental institutions, notably the Council of Ministers, and networks such as Council working groups and regulatory comitology, at the EU level. Across Europe, the state 'retreated' from the function of owner/operator, relinquishing the supply of services to commercial players and privatising the former incumbents.
Analytical Framework

The Competition State
Throughout, the state remained interventionist as a 'competition state', actively remodelling telecommunications structures to ensure national economic competitiveness in global markets (Levi-Faur 1998 and Humphreys and Simpson 2005) . According to Cerny (2000a: 136) , the 'main focus of the competition state …is the proactive promotion of economic activities, at home or abroad, that will make firms and sectors located within the territory of the state competitive in international markets'. The spread of international, competitively ordered markets, underpinned by the neo-liberal reorientation of state behaviour, mandated by a comprehensive EU reform package, might suggest the likely emergence of a more homogenous pattern of governance and competition across the European and international political economy. However, research into the adoption of neo-liberal policies by states has pointed to the persistence of national diversity (see e.g. Weiss 2003) . Nonetheless, this is consistent with competition state theory. In Cerny's (2000a: 130) words, 'the competition state…comes in myriad forms', these depending on factors such as a state's resource endowments and strategic capacities though this variety tends to be framed within the archetypal model of broad neo-liberal flexibility and openness to competition. In the 'Europeanized' context, diversity arises from two policy processes. First, in the EU negotiation process, the Member States, whose preferences varied considerably during the early stages of liberalization, 'up-loaded' (Börzel 2002) policy in-puts to minimize the adaptation costs they subsequently had to bear. Second, once EU rules were agreed, they exploited the scope provided by EU Directives to 'domesticate' (Wallace 2000) EU rules ('downloading'). We explore how this 'uploading' and 'downloading' reflected different 'competition state' orientations.
The Regulatory State
Our inquiry's other axis relates to the new 'regulatory state' in the European telecommunications sector. The paradigm change from 'positive state' to 'regulatory state' denotes the shift from the traditional 'European-style' direct provision of key public services by the state (and state-owned corporations) to the 'American-style' delivery of such services through regulating markets (Seidman and Gilmour 1986; Majone 1994 Majone , 1996 Majone , 1997 . The regulatory state is intimately related to the concept of the competition state. Cerny (2000a: 117) has suggested that the regulatory state is a paradoxical feature of the competition state: '…the emergence of the competition state does not lead to a simple decline of the state but instead necessitates the expansion of de facto state intervention and regulation in the name of competitiveness and marketization.'
In the context of globalization, 'the weight of state interventionism -the so-called "volume of government" -generally tends to increase as states undertake wider regulation and enforcement functions' (Cerny 2000b: 450) . These new patterns of organization strongly evident in globalising economic sectors -such as telecommunications -have led to a focus on the changing 'mechanics' of governance: regulation delivered through publicly funded independent regulatory authorities accompanied by degrees of market liberalization and privatization.
The establishment across the EU of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in telecommunications exemplifies this shift to the 'regulatory state' (Siedman and Gilmour 1986; Majone 1994 Majone , 1996 Majone , 1997 EU telecommunications liberalization involved EU harmonizing re-regulation, the design of new EU-wide regulations and regulatory instruments needed to ensure a level playing field for the promotion of competition and to prevent the former monopoly operators from abusing the market dominance that they still enjoyed even after the formal removal of their monopoly rights. In short, it required transition from 'positive' to 'regulatory' state. Key areas requiring regulation were the licensing of new entrants, the setting of conditions and costs of network access and interconnection, and also the public service aspects of telecommunications. The design and EU-wide harmonization of new procompetitive regulations therefore necessitated a process of intergovernmental negotiation.
Inevitably, in the negotiation process, the Member States, whose preferences variedparticularly during the early stages -attempted to shape EU policies in ways that minimized the adaptation costs that they would subsequently have to bear in implementing the EU-agreed regime. In negotiating the EU rules, the Member States plainly behaved as 'competition states', 'up-loading' their preferences into the 1998 re-regulatory package in ways that catered to their particular strategic capacities and different endowments in terms of perceived competitive advantages and disadvantages.
From the outset, the Member States' positions regarding liberalization varied according to a number of national institutional factors, including their market specificities (large or small, developed or under-developed), the ideological colour of their governments (free market-orientated or otherwise), the structure of domestic group politics (e.g. strong or weak telecoms unions, strong or weak business lobbies for reform), national 'regulatory styles' (legalistic, bureaucratic, light-touch), and their 'models' of capitalism (AngloSaxon, 'Rhineland', étatiste). The need to cater to diverse national preferences was reflected in the considerable discretion that the 1998 regulatory package allowed the Member States for transposition and implementation ('downloading'). The EU regime provided a considerable amount of subsidiarity. The directives established a set of principles and minimum requirements that the Member States were obliged to implement (such as the principle that licence conditions or interconnection tariffs did not impede competition). However, they allowed considerable discretion about how they might be implemented. As noted, routine implementation and enforcement of the regulatory framework were the responsibility of NRAs in the Member States. The 1998 package specified only the need for regulation that was independent of the operators and sufficiently resourced; it allowed for a diversity of NRAs and did not attempt to harmonise their institutional form or operation. Democratic political cultures -had strong public service traditions, universal service provision was left to market actors, with a minimum of regulatory intervention. They had conspicuously light licensing regimes (class licences were the norm with zero to low fees and relatively few conditions); the UK's was actually somewhat less liberal.
In 1998, according to Roy (2000, p. 14) the étatiste category comprised of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal and Greece. These countries' regulatory regimes were characterized by a bureaucratic regulatory style and doubts about the independence of the regulators; in particular, ministries continued to exercise a supervisory role over -while the state retained a significant stake in -the incumbent operator. New entrants were burdened with relatively restrictive licensing regimes, with detailed requirements, and in some cases the regulator appeared reticent, tardy or unable to intervene in a procompetitive manner. The model was characterised by a strong commitment to social and public service goals, which critics claimed was less conducive to competition and favoured the 'national champion' incumbent operator (Roy 2000) . In France, licensing was subjected to a burdensome two-stage approval process, first by the NRA, then by the Ministry. New entrants were obliged by their licence conditions to commit 5 per cent of turnover to research and development. A requirement that market players pay into a universal service fund to compensate France Télécom's provision of 'service public' 8 could be seen as a regulatory subsidy to the national champion incumbent and an anticompetitive burden on new entrants (Humphreys and Simpson 2005: 81-82) . A key rationale for privatizing France Télécom and accepting EU-liberalization was to promote the national champion's expansion in international markets, yet the French version of the 'competition state' maintained some control, through a 54% stake in the company.
Belgium was a notable transposition laggard, in order to gain time to adapt for the incumbent operator Belgacom, part-privatized in 1995 so that it could raise the external investment enabling it to compete in the new environment. New entrants faced onerous licensing application procedures and requirements, including the need to submit a 15-year business plan, and upon full liberalization in 1998 they faced comparatively high interconnection charges (Humphreys and Simpson 2005: 82) .
The intermediate regimes exhibited a mixture of liberal and étatiste features. This camp could be said to comprise of Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria, and Ireland (Roy 2000: 12) .
Most of these countries had been liberalization laggards. Spain was a good example. It negotiated a 5-year extension of the 1 January 1998 full liberalization deadline; however, in the event, it only availed itself of one year. The government had twin objectives: to stimulate competition across the sector; but also to promote a 'hard core' of competitive Spanish companies, to which end it retained influence over key aspects of the market (Jordana 2002: 99-100 to the EU's subsequent attempt both to achieve a greater degree of regulatory harmonization and to take account of increased competition and technological change, notably the 'convergence' of electronic communications systems.
Convergence in Communications and the EU
Application of computer technology to telecommunications switching to create digital switches and technological innovations facilitating computer-to-computer network communications spawned service efficiencies and innovations from the 1970s. and 'regulatory' state at EU level in telecommunications.
Negotiation of the ECRF
The 1998 telecommunications liberalization framework was a key moment in the emergence of the European 'regulatory' and 'competition' state and the reinforcement of the state in both these guises at the national level. However, the extensive nature of the framework was indicative of the degree to which competition in telecommunications had to be engineered and managed subsequently. Pursuing this, actors in telecommunications policy at national and EU levels became convinced that further refinement of EU regulation was necessary. The ensuing process involved further migration towards a liberalised market environment simultaneously increasing the level of involvement of the EU in telecommunications.
Such action was motivated and justified by global developments. In the 1990s, the EU made a policy priority of securing the creation of the much-hyped, though rarely clearly specified (Garnham 2000) , 'Information Society'. The launchpad was the Bangemann Report (European Commission 1994) which, inter alia, stressed that a completely liberalized telecommunications sector was essential for the Information Society. The EU also became aware of the importance of the Internet as a vector for enhancing social and economic welfare promised by Information Society advocates: this soon became central to its eEurope programme (European Commission 2002). One concern was how to secure a stake in the potentially global Internet economy (Christou and Simpson 2004) . Another was that competition bottlenecks in the 'local loop' -the key access point for users to the Internet -were impeding growth in take-up rates which were lower than in the US. Whilst it was unclear how much the proposed HLCG and its compromise successor, the ERG, might in future contribute to the establishment of the European 'regulatory' state in telecommunications, the proposal of a right of veto for the Commission over certain NRA decisions was much more clear-cut. Consequently, it was resisted strongly by Member States. There were two aspects to the issue. First, the Commission proposed that it be given authority to establish a list of markets within telecommunications to be subject to ex ante regulation and would thereafter have a right of veto on any attempt to add to this list. The strong opposition which this generated, particularly from the French, 
